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1 Introduction
Economists are often interested in knowing when the action chosen by an agent will increase (ac-
cording to some ordering) with another variable, so that the two may be regarded as complements.
The theory of monotone comparative statics provides conditions on preferences, such as single cross-
ing di↵erences, that guarantee this behavior. The objective of this paper is to provide a revealed
preference analysis of monotone comparative statics. The starting point of our investigation is a
data set collected from an agent where each observation consists of a choice problem and the action
taken by the agent; we ask what conditions on these observations are necessary and su cient for
them to be consistent with the hypothesis that the agent is choosing according to a preference
that obeys single crossing di↵erences. This is an important question because, if the hypothesis is
supported, then there are grounds for believing that any complementarity observed in the data will
hold more generally, even outside the set of observations.
This introduction sets out the themes in this paper and summarizes our conclusions. The
results discussed in Section 1.n are treated in detail in Section n 2 (for n 1, 2, and 3). Section
2 summarizes some of the key results in monotone comparative statics and games with strategic
complementarity that motivate our analysis.
1.1 Single Crossing Di↵erences and Revealed Complementarity
Consider an agent i who, after observing the realization of some exogenous variable, chooses an
action from a feasible set. There is a binary relation i on xi, ⇠i R R, where xi is a possible
action for agent i and ⇠i is some exogenous variable that may a↵ect the agent’s choice. With some
abuse of terminology, we call i a preference if, for any fixed ⇠i, the restriction of i to the set
xi, ⇠i : ai R is a complete, reflexive, and symmetric relation. Given ⇠i and a feasible action set
Ai R, agent i’s optimal choice (or best response) is
BR ⇠i, Ai, i xi Ai : xi, ⇠i i xi, ⇠i for all xi Ai . (1)
What conditions guarantee that BR ⇠i, Ai is increasing in ⇠i, in the sense that every element
in BR ⇠i , Ai is greater than every element in BR ⇠i, Ai , when ⇠i ⇠i? A fundamental result in
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monotone comparative statics says that, for this to hold on every set Ai, it is necessary and su cient
that i obeys strict single crossing di↵erences (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). This property says
that for every xi xi and ⇠i ⇠i,
xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i ,
where i is the strict preference induced by i. In the case where we restrict the feasible action
sets Ai to intervals of R, then strict single crossing di↵erences can be weakened and replaced by the
strict interval dominance property (Quah and Strulovici, 2009), which says that
xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i for all xi xi, xi xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i .
These basic results motivate the following revealed preference problem. Suppose an observer
has access to a data set with T observations, Oi ati, ⇠ti , Ati Tt 1, where ati is the action chosen by
agent i under the treatment ⇠ti , A
t
i , when the exogenous variable is ⇠
t
i and the feasible action set
is Ati, which we assume is a compact interval of R. What condition on Oi will guarantee that there
exists a binary relation i defined over xi, ⇠i R R that obeys the interval dominance order
and rationalizes the agent’s behavior in the sense that ati BR ⇠
t
i , A
t
i, i ? It turns out that this
hinges on an easy-to-check and easy-to-understand property on Oi we call the axiom of revealed
complementarity (ARC). Suppose that, through his choices, the agent reveals a preference for a
over a , at a given realization of the exogenous variable. This can be a direct revelation in the sense
that a was chosen when a was feasible at some observation, or it could be revealed indirectly via
transitive closure (for example, if a was chosen when b was available at some observation and b was
chosen when a was available at another observation). ARC says the following: if the agent reveals
a preference for a over a with a a when ⇠i   then the agent cannot reveal a preference for
a over a at some ⇠i     . We show that any data set collected from an agent choosing with
a preference obeying strict interval dominance must obey ARC and any data set that obeys ARC
is rationalizable by a preference obeying strict single crossing di↵erences.1
1Readers familiar with Afriat’s Theorem may notice a parallel in the following sense: the general axiom of revealed
preference (GARP) is necessary whenever the consumer is maximizing a locally nonsatiated preference while GARP
is su cient to guarantee a stronger conclusion: that there is a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave function
rationalizing the data. In our case, ARC is necessary for strict interval dominance and su cient for strict single
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1.2 Games with strategic complementarity
An important application of monotone comparative statics is to the study of games with strategic
complementarity (see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990)). These are games where
players’ strategies are complements in the sense that an agent’s best response increases with the
action of other players in the game. These games are known to be very well-behaved: they always
have pure strategy Nash equilibria; in fact, there is always a largest and a smallest pure strategy
Nash equilibrium and a parameter change that leads to one agent having a greater best response
will raise both the largest and smallest equilibrium.
In this context it is natural to pose a revealed preference question analogous to the one we
posed in the single agent case. For each player i (i 1, 2, ..., n), suppose we observe the feasible
action set Ati (assumed to be a compact interval), the action chosen by the player, a
t
i A
t
i, and an
exogenous variable yti (drawn from a poset) that a↵ects player i’s action. An observation t may be
succinctly written as at, yt, At (where at ati
n
i 1, etc.) such that a
t is the observed action profile
in the treatment yt, At and the data set is O at, yt, At Tt 1. Then we can ask whether the
data set is consistent with the hypothesis that the observations constitute Nash equilibria in games
with strategic complementarity. Notice that this hypothesis is at least internally consistent since
we know that these games always have pure strategy Nash equilibria. The answer to our question
is straightforward given the single-agent results: all we need to do is to check that each player’s
choices obey ARC, in the sense that, for all i, Oi ati, ⇠ti , Ati Tt 1, where ⇠i at i, yti , obeys
ARC. (From player i’s perspective, the variables a↵ecting his preference are the realized value of yi
and the actions of other players.)
When the data set O obeys ARC (in the sense that every player obeys ARC), it would be
natural to exploit this data to make predictions of the outcome in a new game, with di↵erent
feasible action sets A0 A0i
n
i 1 and di↵erent exogenous variables y
0 y0i
n
i 1, assuming that the
players’ preferences obey single crossing di↵erences and remain unchanged. We provide a procedure
for working out the set of all possible Nash equilibria in this new game. We also show that this set
has properties that echo those of a set of Nash equilibria in a game with stratgic complementarity:
while the set itself may not have a largest or smallest element, its closure does have a largest and
crossing di↵erences (which is a stronger property).
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a smallest element and these extremal elements increase with y0.
1.3 Revealed preference tests on cross sectional data
So far we have considered an observer who records the behavior of an agent or a group of agents
across a sequence of di↵erent treatments. It is not always possible to obtain data of this type in
empirical settings. Suppose instead that, at each treatment, we observe the joint actions taken
by a large population of n-player groups. Formally, the data set is O µt, yt, At Tt 1, where
µt is a distribution on At. In this case, the natural generalization of our notion of rationalization
is to require that the population can be decomposed into segments such that all groups within a
segment have the same equilibrium play across treatments and the equilibrium play is consistent
with strategic complementarity. This rationalization concept captures the idea that treatments
have been randomly assigned across the whole population of groups, so that the distribution of
‘group types’ is the same across treatments; it allows for preference heterogeneity in the population
but requires every group type to be consistent with strategic complementarity. We show that it is
possible to check whether O µt, yt, At Tt 1 is consistent with strategic complementarity in this
sense by solving a certain system of linear equations. When a data set passes this test, we provide
a procedure to estimate the distribution of equilibrium responses in the population under a new
treatment, again by solving an appropriate linear program.
1.4 Application: spousal influence in smoking behavior
To illustrate the use of our techniques, we apply them to investigate whether spouses influence each
other in their cigarette smoking behavior. The US census provides information on tobacco use in
married couples and smoking policies at their workplaces (whether it is permitted or not).2 The
latter plays the role of the exogenous variable in our analysis and couples are modeled as playing a
2 2 game, where the action is either ‘not smoke’ or ‘smoke’. Strategy sets of both players do not
vary in this application and so there are precisely four treatments, corresponding to the di↵erent
combinations of workplace policies for the couple. The hypothesis is that couples in the population
2The data is taken from the years 1992-93, when there were still significant numbers of workplaces that permitted
smoking.
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are playing games of strategic complementarity, where a husband’s (wife’s) smoking decision is
nondecreasing with respect to the spouse’s smoking behavior and the workplace smoking policy
(with the ordering being the intuitive one). Under each treatment, there are four pure-strategy
outcomes, so there are 44 256 ways a couple could vary its behavior across the four treatments.
It can be shown that 64 of these are consistent with strategic complementarity, so the hypothesis
is that the entire population consists of groups belonging to one of these 64 types. We show that
the data set does not pass the rationalizability test exactly; however, the failure is not statistically
significant, so the strategic complementarity hypothesis cannot be rejected.
1.5 Literature Review
Topkis (1998, Theorem 2.8.9) reports a revealed preference-type result in a monotone choice en-
vironment. He considers a correspondence ' : T R` that maps elements of a totally ordered
set T to compact sublattices of the Euclidean space Rl. He shows that this correspondence is
increasing in the strong set order if and only if there is a function f : R` T R such that
' t argmaxx R` f x, t where f is supermodular in x and has increasing di↵erences in x, t .
Notice that the rationalizability concept used by Topkis is more stringent than the one we employ
since the optimal choices under f must coincide with (rather than simply contain) ' t . In the
case where ' is a choice function, it is not hard to see that such a rationalization is possible even
when T is a partially (rather than totally) ordered set; this has been noted by Carvajal (2004) who
also applies it to a game setting. In our paper, we confine ourselves to the case where actions are
totally ordered (rather than elements of a Euclidean space) and allow observations of choices made
from di↵erent subsets of the set of all possible actions. Consequently, at a given parameter value,
the observer may have partial information on the agent’s ranking over di↵erent actions rather than
simply the globally optimal action. In this respect, the problem is more complicated than the one
posed by Topkis, because the rationalizing preference we construct has to agree with this wider
range of preference information (in addition to obeying single crossing di↵erences).
The extension of our revealed preference tests to cross-sectional data sets with unobserved het-
erogeneity follows an approach that has been taken by other authors (see McFadden and Richter
(1991), McFadden (2005), and Manski (2007)). Manski (2007) also discusses making predictions
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in unobserved treatments, subject to a particular theory of behavior, and our approach to this
issue is in essence the same as his. (He did not, however, consider the specific theory relating to
single crossing di↵erences discussed here). Echenique and Komunjer (2009) develop a structural
model that could be used to test for strategic complementarity in certain special classes of games,
including two person games. Their test relies on a stochastic equilibrium selection rule that places
strictly positive probability on the extremal elements of the set of Nash equilibria and checks cer-
tain observable properties implied by strategic complementarity; the su ciency of those properties
(for rationalizability) is not addressed. Aradillas-Lopez (2011) provides nonparametric probability
bounds for Nash equilibrium actions for a class of games with characteristics that are similar to,
but distinct from, games with strategic complementarity. There are also papers where actions are
assumed to be strategic complements or substitutes in order to sharpen inference or predictions of
one type or another. For example, Kline and Tamer (2012) employ such assumptions to provide
nonparametric bounds for best-replies in the context of binary games; other papers of this type
include Molinari and Rosen (2008), Uetake and Watanabe (2013), and Lazzati (2015). By and
large, the emphasis in these papers is not to test for strategic complementarity but to exploit it as
an assumption; indeed the model may not include the type of exogenous treatment variation that
makes the assumption refutable.
For our empirical implementation at the end of the paper, we test for strategic complementarity
in smoking behavior among married couples by taking advantage of the variation in workplace
smoking policies. Cutler and Glaeser (2010) also exploit this variation for essentially the same
purpose but their work di↵ers from ours in that they use a reduced form parametric model of smoking
behavior; like us, they find evidence of complementarity in smoking behavior among married couples.
While our theoretical results on testing for complementarity are developed in an idealized setting
where population distributions are known, we must necessarily account for sampling variation in the
application; for this we rely on the econometric procedure devised by Kitamura and Stoye (2013).
Those authors use their procedure to implement the test for the strong axiom of revealed preference
on cross sectional data sets (as developed by McFadden and Richter (1991)), but it applies equally
well to our model and to others with a similar structure (such as those discussed in Manski (2007)).
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2 Basic concepts and theory
Our objective in this section is to give a quick review of some basic concepts and results in monotone
comparative statics and of their application to games with strategic complementarities. This will
motivate the revealed preference theory developed later in the paper.
2.1 Monotone choice on intervals
Let Xi R be the set of all conceivable actions of an agent i. A feasible action set of agent i
is a subset Ai of Xi. We assume that Ai is compact in R and that it is an interval of Xi. We
say that a set Ai Xi is an interval of Xi if, whenever x , x Ai, with x x , then, for any
element x˜ Xi such that x x˜ x , x˜ Ai. Given that Ai is both compact and an interval,
we can refer to it as a compact interval. It is clear that there must be ai and a¯i in Ai such that
Ai xi Xi : ai xi a¯i and it is sometimes convenient to denote Ai by ai, a¯i . We denote by
Ai the collection of all compact intervals ofXi. We assume that agent i’s choice over di↵erent actions
in a feasible action set Ai is a↵ected by a parameter ⇠i, where ⇠i is drawn from a partially ordered
set (or poset, for short) ⌅i, ; ⇠i may include certain exogenous variables and/or the actions of
other agents (when we extend the analysis to a game). For the sake of notational simplicity, we
are using the same notation for the orders on Xi and ⌅i and for any other ordered sets; we do not
anticipate any danger of confusion.
A binary relation i on Xi ⌅i is said to be a preference of agent i if, for every fixed ⇠i ⌅i,
i is a complete, reflexive and transitive relation on Xi. We call a preference i regular if, for all
Ai Ai and ⇠i, the set BRi ⇠i, Ai, i (which we may shorten to BRi ⇠i, Ai when there is no danger
of confusion), as defined by (1), is nonempty and compact in R. We refer to BRi ⇠i, Ai as agent
i’s best response or optimal choice at ⇠i, Ai . The best response of agent i is said to be monotone
or increasing in ⇠i if, for every ⇠i ⇠i,
ai BRi ⇠i , Ai and ai BRi ⇠i, Ai ai ai. (2)
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The preference i is said to obey strict interval dominance (SID) if, for every xi xi and ⇠i ⇠i,
xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i for all x xi, xi xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i , (3)
where i is the asymmetric part of i, i.e., xi, ⇠i i yi, ⇠i if xi, ⇠i i yi, ⇠i and yi, ⇠i i
xi, ⇠i . We denote the symmetric part of i by i, i.e., xi, ⇠i i yi, ⇠i if xi, ⇠i i yi, ⇠i and
yi, ⇠i i xi, ⇠i . The following result is a straightforward adaptation of Theorem 1 in Quah and
Strulovici (2009). We shall re-prove it here because of its central role in this paper.
Theorem A. Suppose i is a regular preference on Xi ⌅i. Then agent i has a monotone best
response correspondence if and only if i obeys strict interval dominance.
Proof. To show that i obeys SID, suppose that, for some xi xi and ⇠i ⇠i, the left
side of (3) holds. Letting Ai xi, xi , we obtain xi BRi ⇠i, Ai . Hence, by (2), it also holds
that xi BRi ⇠i , Ai . If xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i were to hold, then xi BRi ⇠i , Ai . However, then
we have that xi BRi ⇠i, Ai , xi BRi ⇠i , Ai , and xi xi , which contradicts (2). Therefore,
xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i . Conversely, suppose ⇠i ⇠i, xi BRi ⇠i , Ai and xi BRi ⇠i, Ai . If xi xi,
then xi, ⇠i i xi, ⇠i for every xi xi , xi Ai. SID guarantees that xi, ⇠i i xi , ⇠i , which
contradicts the assumption that xi BRi ⇠i , Ai .
Readers familiar with the standard theory of monotone comparative statics will notice that our
definition of monotonicity in (2) is stronger than the standard notion, which merely requires that
BRi ⇠i , Ai dominates BRi ⇠i, Ai in the strong set order. This means that, for any xi BRi ⇠i , Ai
and xi BRi ⇠i, Ai , max xi , xi BRi ⇠i , Ai and min xi , xi BRi ⇠i, Ai . In turn, this weaker
notion of monotonicity can be characterized by preferences obeying interval dominance (rather than
strict interval dominance), which is defined as follows: for every xi xi and ⇠i ⇠i,
xi , ⇠i i i xi, ⇠i for every xi xi, xi xi , ⇠i i i xi, ⇠i . (4)
(The reader can verify this claim by a straightforward modification of the proof of Theorem A or
by consulting Theorem 1 in Quah and Strulovici (2009).) Throughout this paper we have chosen to
work with a stronger notion of monotonicity; the weaker notion does not permit meaningful revealed
9
preference analysis because it does not exclude the possibility that an agent is simply indi↵erent to
all actions at every ⇠i. In this sense, our stronger assumption here is analogous to the assumption
of local non-satiation made in Afriat’s Theorem.3
The interval dominance order is Quah and Strulovici’s (2009) generalization of single crossing
di↵erences, due to Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Just as there is strict interval dominance, so there
is a strict version of single crossing di↵erences. We say that a preference relation i has strict single
crossing di↵erences (SSCD) if, for every xi xi and ⇠i ⇠i,
xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i . (5)
It is clear that every preference that obeys SSCD will also satisfy SID. Hence, it is obvious from
Theorem A that if i is a regular preference on Xi ⌅i that obeys SSCD, then agent i has a
monotone best response correspondence BRi ⇠i, Ai for every interval Ai Ai.4
2.2 Strategic complementarity
An important application of monotone comparative statics is to the study of games with strategic
complementarity. Let N 1, 2, ...., n be the set of agents in a game, and let Xi R be the
set of all conceivable actions of agent i. We assume that i has a feasible action set Ai that is a
compact interval of Xi; as before, the family of compact intervals of Xi is denoted by Ai. Agent
i’s choice over di↵erent feasible actions is a↵ected by the actions of other players and also by an
exogenous variable yi, which we assume is drawn from a poset Yi, . Let ⌅i X i Yi, where
X i : j iXj. A typical element of ⌅i is denoted by ⇠i x i, yi and ⌅i is a poset if we endow
it with the product order. We assume that agent i has a preference i on Xi ⌅i, in the sense
defined in Section 2.1.
Given a profile of regular preferences i i N , a joint feasible action set A A i NAi, and
3It is clear that without such an assumption, any type of consumption data is rationalizable since one could
simply suppose that the consumer is indi↵erent across all consumption bundles. For a statement and proof of
Afriat’s Theorem see Varian (1982).
4In fact, SSCD of a preference ensures more than that: it is necessary and su cient for the monotonicity of a
best response correspondence on arbitrary feasible action sets and not only interval feasible action sets. On the
relationship between single crossing di↵erences and the interval dominance order, see Quah and Strulovici (2009).
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a profile of exogenous variables y Y i NYi, we can define a game
G y, A yi i N , Ai i N , i i N .
We say that the family of games G G y, A y,A Y A exhibits strategic complementarity if, for
every A A, the best response of each agent i (as given by (1)) is monotone in ⇠i x i, yi .
It is clear from Theorem A that the family of games G G y, A y,A Y A exhibits strategic
complementarity if and only if i is an SID preference for every agent i.
Example 1. Consider a Bertrand oligopoly with n firms, with each firm producing a single
di↵erentiated product. Assume that firm i has constant marginal cost ci 0, faces the de-
mand function Di pi, p i : R Rn 1 R , and chooses its price pi 0 to maximize profit
⇧i pi, p i, ci pi ci Di pi, p i . Suppose that the firms’ products are substitutes in the sense
that the own-price elasticity of demand,
pi
Di pi, p i
Di
pi
pi, p i
is strictly falling with respect to p i (the prices charged by other firms). Then, the profit of each firm
has SSCD in pi; p i, ci . Hence, on any compact interval of prices, firm i’s set of profit-maximizing
prices is monotone in p i, ci .5 If this property holds for every firm in the industry, the collection
of Bertrand games generated by di↵erent feasible price sets to each firm and di↵erent exogenous
variables, c ci i N , will constitute a collection of games exhibiting strategic complementarity.
It is known that the set of Nash equilibria of a game with strategic complementarity (even in the
weaker sense of best responses increasing in the strong set order) is particularly well-behaved. The
following result summarizes some of its properties. For our purposes, the most important feature of
these games is that they always have pure strategy Nash equilibria, so it is not a priori unreasonable
to hypothesize that players are playing a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in such a game.
Theorem B. Suppose G G y, A y,A Y A exhibits strategic complementarity. Then, for every
game G y, A G, the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria E y,A is a nonempty complete lattice
5Specifically, they guarantee that for any pi pi, ln⇧ pi , p i, ci ln⇧ pi, p i, ci is strictly increasing in p i, ci ,
which implies SSCD (see, Milgrom and Shannon (1994)).
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and, in particular, it has a largest and a smallest Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, both the largest
and smallest Nash equilibria are increasing in y.
The set of Nash equilibria of G y, A coincides with the fixed points of the joint best response
correspondence BR , y, A : A A, where, denoting x i, yi by ⇠i,
BR x, y, A BR1 ⇠1, A1 ,BR2 ⇠2, A2 , ...,BRn ⇠n, An .
Both the non-emptiness and structure of E y,A flow from the fact that this is a very well-behaved
correspondence. Indeed, under strategic complementarity, BRi ⇠i, Ai is increasing in ⇠i (in the
sense of (2), for all i) and so BR x, y, A is increasing in x, y .6
3 Revealed monotone choice
Consider an observer who collects a finite data set from agent i, where each observation consists of
the action chosen by the agent, the set of feasible actions, and the value of the parameter. Formally,
the data set is Oi ati, ⇠ti , Ati t T , where T 1, 2, ..., T . This means that, at observation t, the
agent is subjected to the treatment ⇠ti , A
t
i ⌅
t
i Ai and chooses the action ati Ati. We say that Oi
(or simply, agent i) is consistent with monotonicity or monotone-rationalizable if there is a regular
and SID preference i on Xi ⌅i such that for every t T , ati, ⇠ti i xi, ⇠ti for every xi Ati. The
motivation for this definition is clear given Theorem A: if Oi is monotone-rationalizable then we
have found a preference that (i) accounts for the observed behavior of the agent and (ii) guarantees
that the agent’s optimal choice based on this preference is increasing in ⇠i, on any feasible action
set that is an interval. Our principal objective in this section is to characterize those data sets that
are monotone-rationalizable.
6See Topkis (1998) for the proof of Theorem B. The complete lattice structure of E A, y was first pointed out in
Zhou (1994), and the monotone comparative statics of extremal equilibria is found in Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
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3.1 The axiom of revealed complementarity
We first introduce the revealed preference relations induced by Oi. The direct revealed preference
relation Ri is defined in the following way: xi , ⇠i
R
i xi, ⇠i if xi , ⇠i a
t
i, ⇠
t
i and xi A
t
i
for some t T . The indirect revealed preference relation RTi is the transitive closure of Ri , i.e.,
xi , ⇠i
RT
i xi, ⇠i if there exists a finite sequence z
1
i , z
2
i , ..., z
k
i in Xi such that
xi , ⇠i
R
i z
1
i , ⇠i
R
i z
2
i , ⇠i
R
i ...
R
i z
k
i , ⇠i
R
i xi, ⇠i . (6)
The motivation for this terminology is clear. If we observe, at some treatment ⇠i, Ai , agent i
playing xi when xi Ai, then it must be the case that xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i if agent i is optimizing
with respect to the preference i. Furthermore, given that i is transitive, if xi , ⇠i
RT
i xi, ⇠i
then xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i .
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A relation R on Xi ⌅i said to have the interval property if, whenever xi, ⇠i R x˜i, ⇠i , for xi,
x˜i in Xi, then xi, ⇠i R zi, ⇠i for any zi between xi and x˜i, i.e., xi zi x˜i or x˜i zi xi. This
property plays an important role in our results. The lemma below uses the assumption that feasible
action sets are compact intervals to guarantee that RTi has the interval property.
Lemma 1. The relation RTi in Xi ⌅i induced by Oi ati, ⇠ti , Ati Tt 1 has the interval property.
Proof. If xi , ⇠i
R
i xi, ⇠i , then there is A
t
i such that xi a
t
i and xi A
t
i. Since A
t
i
is an interval, it is clear that xi , ⇠i
R
i xi, ⇠i for any xi between xi and xi. Now suppose
xi , ⇠i
RT
i xi, ⇠i , but xi , ⇠i
R
i xi, ⇠i . Then, we have a sequence like (6). Suppose also that
xi xi and consider xi such that xi xi xi. (The case where xi xi can be handled in a
similar way.) Letting z0i xi and z
k 1
i xi, we know that there exists at least one 0 m k
such that zmi xi z
m 1. Since zmi , ⇠i
R
i z
m 1
i , ⇠i , it must hold that z
m
i , ⇠i
R
i xi, ⇠i . This
in turn implies that xi , ⇠i z
0
i , ⇠i
RT
i xi, ⇠i , since z
0
i , ⇠i
RT
i z
m
i , ⇠i .
Definition 1. The data set Oi ati, ⇠ti , Ati Tt 1 obeys the Axiom of Revealed Complementarity
7Note, however, that Ri and
RT
i are not generally complete on Xi for every fixed ⇠i; as such, these relations
are not preferences as we have defined them.
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(ARC) if, for every s, t T ,
⇠ti ⇠
s
i , a
t
i a
s
i , and a
s
i , ⇠
s
i
RT
i a
t
i, ⇠
s
i a
t
i, ⇠
t
i
RT
i a
s
i , ⇠
t
i . (7)
It is clear that ARC is a non-vacuous restriction on data. So long as the number of observations
Oi is finite (as it is by assumption), checking whether two elements asi , ⇠si and ati, ⇠si are related
by RTi is a finite procedure and, consequently, so is checking for ARC. It is also clear that there are
no computational di culties, whether theoretical or practical, associated with the implementation
of this test.
For a data set to obey monotone-rationalizability, it is necessary that it obeys ARC. Indeed,
suppose there are observations s and t such that ⇠ti ⇠
s
i , a
t
i a
s
i , and a
s
i , ⇠
s
i
RT
i a
t
i, ⇠
s
i . By
Lemma 1, RTi has the interval property, and so a
s
i , ⇠
s
i
RT
i xi, ⇠
s
i for all xi a
t
i, a
s
i . Since
Oi is SID-rationalizable, there is an SID preference i on Xi ⌅i such that asi , ⇠si i xi, ⇠si
for all xi ati, a
s
i . The SID property on i guarantees that a
s
i , ⇠
t
i i a
t
i, ⇠
t
i , which means
ati, ⇠
t
i
RT
i a
s
i , ⇠
t
i .
Our more substantial claim is that ARC is also su cient for monotone-rationalizability. In fact,
an even stronger property is true: whenever a data set obeys ARC, it is rationalizable by an SSCD
(and not just SID) preference.8 The next result summarizes our main findings.
Theorem 1. The following statements on the data set Oi ati, ⇠ti , Ati t T are equivalent:
(a) Oi is monotone-rationalizable.
(b) Oi obeys ARC.
(c) Oi is rationalizable by a regular and SSCD preference relation on Xi ⌅i.
Since every SSCD preference is also an SID preference, c implies a , and we have just shown
that (a) implies (b). It remains for us to show that (b) implies (c). Our proof involves first working
8This phenomenon, which may seem surprising, is not unknown to revealed preference analysis; for example, it
is present in Afriat’s Theorem. In that context, the data consist of observations of consumer’s consumption bundles
at di↵erent linear budget sets. If the agent is maximizing a locally non-satiated preference, then the data set must
obey a property called the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP, for short); conversely, if a data set obeys
GARP then it can be rationalized by a preference that is not just locally non-satiated but also obeys continuity,
strong monotonicity, and convexity.
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out the (incomplete) revealed preference relations on Xi ⌅i that must be satisfied by any SID
preference that rationalizes the data and then explicitly constructing a rationalizing preference on
Xi ⌅i that completes that incomplete relation and obeys SSCD.
GivenOi, the single crossing extension of the indirect revealed preference relation RTi is another
binary relation RTSi defined in the following way:
(i) for xi xi, xi , ⇠i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i if there is ⇠i ⇠i such that xi , ⇠i
RT
i xi, ⇠i ;
(ii) for xi xi, xi , ⇠i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i , if there is ⇠i ⇠i such that xi , ⇠i
RT
i xi, ⇠i .
Let RTSi be the binary relation given by
RTS
i
RT
i
RTS
i . (Note that
RTS
i is not the
asymmetric part of RTSi .) It follows immediately from its definition that
RTS
i also has strict
single crossing di↵erences, in the following sense: if xi xi and ⇠i ⇠i or xi xi and ⇠i ⇠i,
then
xi , ⇠i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i xi , ⇠i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i . (8)
In addition, let RTSTi be the transitive closure of
RTS
i , i.e., xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i if there exists a
sequence z1i , z
2
i , ..., z
k
i such that
xi , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
2
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ...
RTS
i z
k
i , ⇠i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i . (9)
If we can find at least one strict relation RTSi in the sequence (9), then, we let xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i
(which, once again, is not the asymmetric part of RTSTi ). The relevance of the binary relations
RTST
i and
RTST
i flows from the following result, which says that any rationalizing preference for
agent i must respect the ranking implied by them.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the preference i obeys SID and rationalizes Oi ati, ⇠ti , Ati t T .
Then i extends RTSTi and
RTST
i in the following sense:
xi , ⇠i
RTST
i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i xi , ⇠i i i xi, ⇠i (10)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may let xi xi. Since i is transitive, it is clear
that we need only show that xi , ⇠i i i xi, ⇠i whenever xi , ⇠i
RTS
i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i . If
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xi , ⇠i
RTS
i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i then there exists some ⇠i ⇠i such that xi , ⇠i
RT
i xi, ⇠i . By
the interval property of RTi , we obtain xi , ⇠i
RT
i xi, ⇠i for all xi xi, xi . Since i rationalizes
Oi, we also have xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i for all xi xi, xi . By SID of i, we obtain xi , ⇠i i i xi, ⇠i
for ⇠i ⇠i.
At this point, it is reasonable to ask if we could go beyond the revealed preference relations we
have already constructed and consider the single crossing extension of RTSTi , the transitive closure
of that extension, and so on. The answer to that is ‘no’ because, as we shall show in Lemma 2,
RTST
i obeys SSCD, so it does not admit a nontrivial single crossing extension. By Proposition 1,
it is clear that, in order for Oi to be monotone rationalizable, the binary relation RTSTi must have
the following property: for any xi, ⇠i and xi , ⇠i in Xi ⌅i,
xi, ⇠i
RTST
i xi , ⇠i xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i . (11)
If not, we obtain simultaneously, xi, ⇠i i xi , ⇠i and xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i , which is impossible.
The following lemma summarizes our observations on RTSTi .
Lemma 2. Suppose that Oi obeys ARC. Then RTSTi obeys SSCD and property (11).
Since Ri
RTST
i , it is clear that Proposition 1 has a converse: if there is a regular and SID
preference i on Xi ⌅i that obeys (10), then this preference rationalizes Oi. This observation,
together with Lemma 2, suggest that a reasonable way of constructing a rationalizing preference is
to begin with RTSTi and
RTST
i and then complete these incomplete relations in a way that gives a
preference with the required properties, which is precisely the approach we take. Define the binary
relation i on Xi ⌅i in the following manner:
xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i if xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i
or xi , ⇠i kRTSTi xi, ⇠i and xi xi , (12)
where xi , ⇠i kRTSTi xi, ⇠i means neither xi , ⇠i RTSTi xi, ⇠i nor xi, ⇠i RTSTi xi , ⇠i . The
following result (which we prove in the Appendix with the help of Lemma 2) completes our argument
that (b) implies (c) in Theorem 1.
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Lemma 3. Suppose that Oi obeys ARC. The binary relation i is an SSCD preference that ratio-
nalizes Oi. On every set K Xi that is compact in R and for every ⇠i ⌅i, BRi ⇠i, K, i is
nonempty and finite; in particular, i is a regular preference
3.2 ARC and SSCD
Theorem 1 tells us that when an agent has an SID preference, then any data set collected from
this agent must obey ARC. It also says that if a data set obeys ARC, then the agent’s actions
can be accounted for by an SID preference, and moreover, we can explicitly construct a preference
consistent with those observations that obey the stronger property of SSCD. It is known that SSCD
is su cient (and, in fact, also necessary in some sense) for an agent’s optimal action to be increasing
with the parameter ⇠i on all arbitrary constraint sets drawn fromXi (see Edlin and Shannon (1998)).
It follows that when a data set Oi is monotone-rationalizable, we can find a preference that both
explains the data and guarantees that the optimal choices based on this preference is monotone, on
any arbitrary feasible action set (and not just intervals).
So far we have maintained the assumption that the observed feasible action sets Ati are intervals.
Now consider a data set Oi ati, ⇠ti , Bti t T , where ati is the observed choice from Bti , and Bti is a
compact subset ofXi that is not necessarily an interval. It is easy to check that if Oi is rationalizable
by an SSCD preference then it must obey ARC and, given the characterization of SSCD preferences,
we may be tempted to think that the converse is also true. However, as the following example shows,
that is not the case and so a revealed preference theory built around arbitrary observed feasible
action sets and SSCD must involve a data set property di↵erent from ARC; we leave this interesting
issue to further research.
Example 2. Let Xi ui, vi, wi with ui vi wi, and let A1i ui, wi , A
2
i ui, vi , and
A3i vi, wi . Note that A
1
i is not an interval of Xi. Suppose that ⇠
1
i ⇠
2
i ⇠
3
i , and that a
1
i wi,
a2i ui, and a
3
i vi. Then wi, ⇠
1
i
R
i ui, ⇠
1
i , ui, ⇠
2
i
R
i vi, ⇠
2
i , and vi, ⇠
3
i
R
i wi, ⇠
3
i . The
indirect revealed preference relation RTi is equal to the direct revealed preference relation
R
i in this
example and, clearly, this set of three observations obeys ARC. However, it cannot be rationalized
by an SSCD preference. Suppose, instead that an SSCD preference i rationalizes the data. Then,
it must hold that wi, ⇠1i i ui, ⇠
1
i and, by SSCD, wi, ⇠
2
i i ui, ⇠
2
i . In addition, we have
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ui, ⇠2i i vi, ⇠
2
i and so wi, ⇠
2
i i vi, ⇠
2
i . Since i obeys SSCD, we obtain wi, ⇠
3
i i vi, ⇠
3
i ,
which contradicts the direct revealed preference vi, ⇠3i i wi, ⇠
3
i .
3.3 Out-of-sample predictions
Suppose an observer collects a data set Oi ati, ⇠ti , Ati t T that is monotone rationalizable, and
then, maintaining that hypothesis, asks the following question: what do the observations in Oi say
about the set of possible choices of agent i in some treatment ⇠0, A0 ⌅i A?9 If Oi obeys ARC,
then we know that the set of all SID preferences that rationalize Oi, call it Pi , is nonempty. For
each i Pi , the set of best responses at ⇠0i , A0i is BRi ⇠0i , A0i , i , and hence the set of possible
best responses at ⇠0i , A
0
i is given by
PRi ⇠
0, A0 :
i Pi
BRi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i , i . (13)
It follows from Theorem 1 that,
PRi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i x˜i A
0
i : Oi Oi x˜i, ⇠0i , A0i obeys ARC , (14)
where Oi is the data set Oi augmented by the (fictitious) observation a˜i, ⇠0i , A0i . The following
proposition shows that PRi ⇠0i ;A
0
i coincides with the undominated elements with respect to
RTST
i .
Proposition 2. Suppose that Oi obeys ARC. For any ⇠0 ⌅i, it holds that
PRi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i xi A
0
i : xˆi A
0
i such that xˆi, ⇠
0
i
RTST
i xi, ⇠
0
i . (15)
Proof. It follows from (14) that (15) holds provided we can show the following: Oi Oi
x˜i, ⇠0i , A
0
i violates ARC if and only if there is xˆi A
0
i such that xˆi, ⇠
0
i
RTST
i x˜i, ⇠
0
i . Let
R
i ,
RT
i ,
RTS
i , and
RTST
i be the revealed preference relations derived from Oi Oi x˜i, ⇠0i , A0i ; by
definition, these must contain the analogous revealed preference relations ofOi, i.e., Ri , RTi , RTSi ,
and RTSTi . Suppose there is xˆi A
0
i such that xˆi, ⇠
0
i
RTST
i x˜i, ⇠
0
i and so xˆi, ⇠
0
i
RTST
i x˜i, ⇠
0
i .
9The environment ⇠0, A0 may – or may not – be distinct from the ones already observed in the data set; the
latter can still be an interesting question since optimal choices are not unique.
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Figure 1: E A0 in Example 3
On the other hand, since xˆi A0i , we have x˜ i, ⇠
0
i
R
i xˆi, ⇠
0
i . This is a violation of the property
(11) and, by Lemma 2, Oi violates ARC. Conversely, suppose that Oi Oi x˜i, ⇠0i , A0i violates
ARC. Since Oi obeys ARC, this violation can only occur in two ways: there is xˆi Xi such that
x˜i, ⇠0i
RT
i xˆi, ⇠
0
i and xˆi, ⇠¯i
RT
i x˜i, ⇠¯i with either (1) xˆi x˜i and ⇠¯i ⇠
0
i or (2) xˆi x˜i
and ⇠¯i ⇠0i . We need to show that x˜i is dominated (with respect to
RTST
i ) by some element
in A0i . In either cases (1) or (2), since xˆi, ⇠¯i
RT
i x˜i, ⇠¯i , we obtain xˆi, ⇠
0
i
RTS
i x˜i, ⇠
0
i . If
xˆi A0i , we are done. If xˆi A
0
i then, given that x˜i, ⇠
0
i
RT
i xˆi, ⇠
0
i , there exists x¯i A
0
i such that
x¯i, ⇠0i
RT
i xˆi, ⇠
0
i . Thus x¯i, ⇠
0
i
RTST
i x˜i, ⇠
0
i .
It is very convenient to have Proposition 2 because computing RTSTi is straightforward and
thus it is also straightforward to obtain the set of possible responses at a given treatment.
Example 3. Consider two observations as depicted in Figure 1, where A1i and A
2
i are the feasible
sets of agent i at observations 1 and 2 respectively, while ⇠1i and ⇠
2
i are the parameter values at each
observation. Let A0i be the blue segment in the figure. It is easy to check that observations 1 and
2 obey ARC, and that the set of possible best responses, PRi a0i ;A
0
i , is the set indicated in the
figure. Notice that this set is not closed since ai PRi a
0
i , A
0
i . Indeed, a
2
i , ⇠
1
i
RTS
1 ai , ⇠
1
i since
a2i , ⇠
2
i
R
i ai , ⇠
2
i . Furthermore, a
1
i , ⇠
1
i
R
i a
2
i , ⇠
1
i and so we obtain a
1
i , ⇠
1
i
RTST
i ai , ⇠
1
i .
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4 Revealed strategic complementarity
Let G G y, A y,A Y A be a collection of games, as defined in the Section 2.2. We consider an
observer who has a set of observations drawn from this collection. Each observation consists of a
triple at, yt, At , where at is the action profile observed at the treatment yt, At Y A. The set
of observations is finite and is denoted by O at, yt, At t T , where T 1, 2, ..., T .
Definition 2. A data set O at, yt, At t T is consistent with strategic complementarity (or
SC-rationalizable) if there exists a profile of regular and SID preferences i i N such that each
observation constitutes a Nash equilibrium, i.e., for every t T , ati, at i, yti i xi, at i, yt for all
xi Ati.
The motivation for this definition is clear. IfO is SC-rationalizable then we have found a profile of
preference i i N such that (i) at is a Nash equilibrium of G At, yt and (ii) the family of games G
G y, A y,A Y A, where G y, A yi i N , Ai i N , i i N exhibits strategic complementarity (in
the sense defined in Section 2.2).
For each agent i, we can define the agent data set Oi ati, ⇠ti , Ati Tt 1 induced by O, where
⇠ti a
t
i, y
t
i . We say that O at, At, yt t T obeys ARC if Oi obeys ARC, for every agent i. It
is clear that O is SC-rationalizable if and only if Oi is monotone-rationalizable for every agent i.
This leads to the following result, which is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and provides
with us with an easy-to-implement test of SC-rationalizability.
Theorem 2. The data set O at, yt, At t T is SC-rationalizable if and only if it obeys ARC.
We turn now to the issue of out-of-sample equilibrium predictions. Given an SC-rationalizable
data set O at, At, yt t T , the agent data set Oi obeys ARC and so the set of regular and
SID preferences that rationalize Oi, i.e., Pi , is nonempty. The observed strategy profile at in O
is supported as a Nash equilibrium by any preference profile i i N in P : i NPi . For each
i i N P , we know from Theorem B that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria at another
game G y0, A0 , which we shall denote by E y0, A0, i i N , is nonempty and hence
E y0, A0 :
i i N P E y
0, A0, i i N
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is also nonempty. E y0, A0 is the set of possible Nash equilibria of the game G y0, A0 . This gives
rise to two related questions that we shall answer in this section: [1] how can we compute E y0, A0
from the data? and [2] what can we say about the structure of E y0, A0 ?
4.1 Computable characterization of E y0, A0
Recall that PRi ⇠i, A0i denotes the possible best responses of player i in A
0
i to ⇠i a i, y
0
i (see
(13)). Given this, we define the joint possible response correspondence PR , y0, A0 : A0 A0 by
PR a, y0, A0 PR1 a 1, y
0
1;A
0
1 ,PR2 a 2, y
0
2, A
0
2 , ...,PRn a n, y
0
n, A
0
n . (16)
The crucial observation to make in computing E y0, A0 is that just as the set of Nash equilibria
in a game coincides with the fixed points of its joint best response correspondence, so the set of
possible Nash equilibria, E y0, A0 , coincides with the fixed points of PR , y0, A0 . Equivalently,
one could think of E y0, A0 as the intersection of the graphs of each player’s possible response
correspondence, i.e., E y0, A0 i N  i y0, A0 , where
 i y
0, A0 ai, a i A
0 : ai PRi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i . (17)
Therefore, the computation of E A0; y0 hinges on the computation of PRi , y0i , A0 : A i A0i .
Two features of this correspondence together make it possible for us to compute it explicitly.
First, we know from Proposition 2 that, for any a i, the set PRi a i, y0i , A
0
i coincides exactly
with those elements in A0i that are not dominated (with respect to
RTST
i ) by another element in
A0i . Since the data set is finite, PRi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i can be constructed after a finite number of steps
and, in fact, one could also show that it consists of a finite number of intervals.
Second, the correspondence PRi , y0i , A
0 takes only finitely many distinct values. For j i, let
ATj aj Xj : a j such that aj, a j a
t for some t T
We denote by Ij the collection consisting of all subsets of A0j of the following two types: the
singleton sets a˜j , where a˜j is in the set A
0
j A
T
j A
0
j maxA
0
j minA
0
j and the interval sets
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a A0j : a˜ a b˜ , where a˜ A
0
j and b˜ is the element in A
0
j immediately above a˜. We denote by
Hi the collection of hyper-rectangles
I1 I2 ... Ii 1 Ii 1 ... IN
where Ij Ij, for j i; note that these hyper-rectangles are subsets of j iA0j . Then one could
show that for any hyper-rectangle Hi Hi, the following property holds:
a i, a i Hi PRi a i, y
0
i ;A
0
i PRi a i, y
0
i ;A
0
i . (18)
In other words, the correspondence PRi , y0i ;A
0
i is constant within each hyper-rectangleHi. There-
fore, to compute this correspondence we need only find its value via (15) for a typical element within
each hyper-rectangle Hi in the finite collection Hi.
It follows from these two observations that the graph of player i’s possible response correspon-
dence (as defined by (17)) is also given by
 i y
0, A0 ai, a i A
0 : aˆi A
0
i such that aˆi, a i, y
0
i
RTST
i ai, a i, y
0
i (19)
and can be explicitly constructed. Furthermore, because PRi a i, y0i , A
0
i consists of a finite union
of intervals of A0i ,  i y
0, A0 is a finite union of hyper-rectangles in A0. The following theorem,
which we prove in the Appendix, summarizes these observations.
Theorem 3. Suppose a data set O at, yt, At Tt 1 obeys ARC and let y0, A0 Y A.
(i) PRi , y0i , A
0
i obeys (15) and (18) and, for any a i j iA
0
j , PRi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i consists of a
finite union of intervals of A0i .
(ii) The graph of PRi , y0i , A
0
i ,  i y
0, A0 , is a finite union of hyper-rectangles in A0. Conse-
quently, the set of possible Nash equilibria, E y0, A0 i N  i y0, A0 , is also a finite union
of hyper-rectangles in A0.
Example 4. Figure 2(a) depicts two observations, a1, A1 and a2, A2 , drawn from two games
involving two players. This data set obeys ARC and we would like to compute E A0 , where
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Figure 2: E A0 in Example 4
A0i A
1
i A
2
i (for i 1, 2). First, we claim that the unshaded area in Figure 2(b) cannot be
contained in  1 A0 . Indeed, consider the point x x1, x2 in the unshaded area, at which
x1 a
1
1, x2 a
1
2, and x1 A
1
1. Therefore, a
1
1, a
1
2
R
1 x1, a
1
2 and so a
1
1, a
1
2
RT
1 x1, a
1
2 . Since
x2 a
1
2, a
1
1, a
1
2
RTS
1 x1, a
1
2 , which means that x1, x2  1 A
0 . Using (19), it is easy to check
that  1 A0 corresponds precisely to the shaded area in Figure 2(b). Similarly,  2 A0 consists of
the shaded area in Figure 2(c). The common shaded area, as depicted with the darker shade in
Figure 2(d), represents E A0  1 A0  2 A0 . Note that the dashed lines are excluded from
E A0 , so this set is not closed.
4.2 The structure of E y0, A0
As we have pointed out in Section 2.2, the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a game with
strategic complementarity admits a largest and smallest Nash equilibrium, both of which exhibit
monotone comparative statics with respect to exogenous parameters. In this subsection, we show
that these properties are largely inherited by the set of predicted pure strategy Nash equilibria
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E y0, A0 . The next result (which we prove in the Appendix) lists the main structural properties of
E y0, A0 ; we have consciously presented them in a way that is analogous to Theorem B.
Theorem 4. Suppose a data set O at, yt, At t T obeys ARC and let y0, A0 Y A. Then
E y0, A0 , the set of possible pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game G y0, A0 , is nonempty. Its
closure admits a largest and a smallest element, both of which are increasing in y0 Y .
Since A0 is a subcomplete sublattice of Rn, , any set in A0 will have a supremum and an
infimum in A0. Therefore, the principal claim in Theorem 4 is that the supremum and infimum of
the closure of E y0, A0 are contained in that set (and thus arbitrarily close to elements of E y0, A0 ):
to all intents and purposes, we could speak of a largest and a smallest possible Nash equilibrium.
Note that the analogous statement in Theorem B is stronger since it says that the set of pure
strategy Nash equilibria (even when it is not closed) has a largest and a smallest element; however,
Example 3 in Section 3.3 shows that the conclusion in Theorem 4 cannot be strengthened since in
that case the possible response set does not contain its supremum.
In the special but important case where A0 is finite, every subset of A0 is closed and so it follows
immediately from Theorem 4 that E y0, A0 is a closed set with a largest and smallest element.
The conclusion of Theorem 4 may also be strengthened in the case where the feasible action set
of every agent is unchanged throughout the observations, i.e. At A0 A for all t T . By
(14), a necessary and su cient condition for a˜i A0 to be contained in PRi a i, y0i ;A
0
i is that
Oi Oi a˜i, a i, y0i , A0i obeys ARC. If A0 At for all t T , then it is straightforward to
check that this is equivalent to a˜i having the following property:
for all t T , a˜i ati if a i, y0i ⇠ti and a˜i ati if a i, y0i ⇠ti . (20)
It follows that PRi a i, y0i , A
0
i must be a closed interval in A
0
i and (by Theorem 3) its graph
 i y0, A0 is a finite union of closed hyper-rectangles. Therefore, E y0;A0 i N  i y0, A0 is also
closed and, by Theorem 4, it must contain its largest and smallest element.
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5 Testing for complementarity with cross sectional data
So far in this paper we have assumed that the observer has access to panel data that gives the
actions of the same agent (or, in the case of a game, the same group of agents) across di↵erent
treatments. Oftentimes, data of this type is not available; instead, we only observe the actions of
di↵erent agents, with presumably heterogeneous preferences, subject to di↵erent treatments. It is
possible to extend our revealed preference analysis to this setting, provided we assume that the
distribution of preferences is the same across populations subject to di↵erent treatments or, put
another way, the assignment of agents or groups to treatments is random.
5.1 Stochastic monotone rationalizability
Suppose we observe a population of agents, whom we shall call population i, choosing actions from
a subset of a chain Xi. Throughout this section (and unlike previous sections), we shall require that
Xi be a finite chain. As usual, we assume agents choose from feasible sets that are intervals of Xi.
Preferences are potentially a↵ected by a set of parameters ⌅i. At each observation t, all agents in
population i are subject to the same treatment ⇠ti , A
t
i ⌅i Ai, though they may choose di↵erent
actions because they have di↵erent preferences. We assume that the true distribution of actions is
observable and given by µti, where µ
t
i xi denotes the fraction of agents who choose action xi; we
require µti xi 0 for all xi A
t
i. The (cross sectional) data set for population i is a collection of
triples µti, ⇠
t
i , A
t
i , i.e., Oi µti, ⇠ti , Ati t T , where T 1, 2, ..., T . Given Oi, we denote the set
of observed treatments by Ei, i.e., Ei ⇠ti , A
t
i t T . We allow for the same treatment to occur
at di↵erent observations; it is possible that µt µs even though the treatments at observations t
and s are identical since we do not require agents to have unique optimal actions.10 We adopt the
convention of allowing the same treatment to be repeated in the set Ei if it occurs at more than
one observation.
We call ai a1i , a
2
i , ..., a
T
i t TA
t
i a monotone rationalizable path on Ei if the induced ‘panel’
data set ati, ⇠
t
i , A
t
i t T is monotone-rationalizable (in the sense defined in Section 3) and denote
10If it helps, one could think of the index t itself to be part of the treatment, which may influence an agent’s
selection rule amongst optimal choices, though it has no impact on the agent’s preference or the feasible alternatives,
which depend only on the ‘real’ treatment.
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the set of monotone rationalizable paths by Ai. Since we allow for non-unique optimal choices, two
distinct monotone rationalizable paths may be rationalized by the same SID preference.
Definition 3. A data set Oi µt, ⇠ti , Ati t T is stochastically monotone rationalizable if there
exists a probability distribution Qi on Ai, the set of monotone rationalizable paths on Ei, such that
µti xi ai Ai Qi ai 1 a
t
i xi for all t T and xi Xi.
When there is no danger of confusion, we shall simply refer to a data set as monotone rational-
izable when it is stochastically monotone rationalizable. The definition says that the population i
can be decomposed into types corresponding to di↵erent monotone rationalizable paths, so that the
observed behavior of each type (across treatments) is consistent with maximizing an SID preference;
it captures the idea that treatments have been randomly assigned across the entire population by
requiring that the distribution of types is the same across treatments.11
Theorem 1 tells us that a path ai on Ei is monotone rationalizable if and only if it is ARC-
consistent in the sense that the data set ati, ⇠
t
i , A
t
i t T obeys ARC. Therefore, we have the following
result.
Theorem 5. A data set Oi µt, ⇠ti , Ati t T is monotone rationalizable if and only if there exists
a probability distribution Qi on Ai , the set of ARC-consistent paths on Ei, such that
µti xi
ai Ai
Qi ai 1 a
t
i xi for all t T and xi Xi. (21)
This theorem sets out a procedure that could, in principle, allow us to determine the monotone-
rationalizability of a stochastic data set: first, we need to list all the ARC-consistent paths, and
then we solve the linear equations given by (21). Of course, whether or not this procedure is
implementable in practice will depend crucially on the number of observations, treatments, and
possible actions, which determines the size of the set of ARC-consistent paths.
11While our definition of monotone rationalizable paths excludes the possibility that some group in the population
may decide among non-unique optimal actions stochastically, the large population assumption means that this is
without loss of generality. If, say, 10% of the population is indi↵erent between two optimal actions a and a at some
observation t, and decides between them by flipping a fair coin, then it simply means that 5% will belong to a type
that chooses a at t and another 5% to a type that choose a at t. A data set drawn from a large population of agents
with heterogenous SID preferences who use stochastic selection rules (when there are multiple optimal actions) will
still be stochastically monotone rationalizable in the sense defined here.
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Given a monotone-rationalizable stochastic data set Oi µti, ⇠ti , Ati t T , we may wish to
predict behavior at some given treatment, ⇠0i , A
0
i . The prediction consists of all those distributions
on A0i that are compatible with the data set. Formally, a distribution µ
0
i on Xi is a possible
response distribution at ⇠0i , A
0
i if the augmented stochastic data set O µ0i , ⇠0i , A0i is monotone
rationalizable. It follows immediately from Theorem 5 that µ0i is a possible response distribution at
⇠0i , A
0
i if and only if there exists a probability distribution Qi on Ai , the set of ARC-consistent
paths on the set of environments Ei ⇠0i , A
0
i , such that for every t T 0 and xi Xi,
µti xi
ai Ai
Qi ai 1 a
t
i xi for all t T 0 and xi Xi.12 (22)
It is worth noting that we allow for ⇠0i , A
0
i ⇠
t
i , A
t
i for some observation t and, indeed, it
is instructive to consider that case. Then µti is clearly a possible response distribution but since
multiple optimal actions are permitted, the set of all such distributions can be strictly larger. In
other words, in determining whether or not a distribution is a possible response distribution, we
allow for the possibility that agents in the population with multiple optimal actions at the treatment
⇠ti , A
t
i could switch to a di↵erent optimal action than the one taken at t .
Let us denote the set of possible response distributions by PRDi ⇠0i , A
0
i . All the elements
of PRDi ⇠0i , A
0
i can be obtained by solving the equations (22). The unknown variables in this
system are Qi ai for all ai Ai and µ
0
i xi for all xi A
0
i , and the equations are linear in these
variables. Very conveniently, this implies that PRDi ⇠0i , A
0
i is a convex set. We may be interested
in establishing the possible fraction of agents who will choose a particular action x˜i in the treatment
⇠0i , A
0
i . Since PRDi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i is a convex set, this is given precisely by the closed interval
min µ0i x˜i : µ
0
i PRDi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i , max µ
0
i x˜i : µ
0
i PRDi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i
The value of max µ0i x˜i : µ
0
i PRDi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i can be obtained by solving the following linear
program:
maxµ0i x˜i subject to Qi ai ai Ai and µ
0
i xi xi A0i satisfying (22).
12It follows from this definition that µti xi 0 if xi A
0
i .
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In a similar vein, we can calculate min µ0i a˜i : µ
0
i PRDi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i .
5.2 Stochastic strategic complementarity
The results on stochastic monotone rationalizability have an analog in a game-theoretic framework.
In this case, we assume that the population consists of groups of n players, with each group choosing
an action profile from their joint feasible set A i NAi, where Ai is an interval of a finite chain
Xi. The player in role i takes an action in Ai; the player’s preference over his/her actions is a↵ected
by the actions of other players in that group and by some exogenous variable drawn from Yi. We
assume that the observer can distinguish amongst players in di↵erent roles in the game and can
observe their actions separately; for example, in a population of heterosexual couples, the observer
can distinguish between the ‘husband’ player and the ‘wife’ player and can observe their actions
separately.
At observation t, each group in the population chooses an action profile from the joint feasible
action set At A, with the exogenous parameter being yt Y i NYi.; thus all groups in the
population are subject to the same treatment yt, At Y A, with observed di↵erences in action
profiles stemming from heterogenous preferences amongst players within each group and possibly
di↵erent equilibrium selection rules. We observe a probability distribution µt, with support on At,
where µt x denotes the fraction of groups in which the action profile x X is played. Therefore,
the data set can be written as O µt, yt, At t T . We denote the set of observed treatments by
E, i.e., E yt, At t T . The possibility of multiple equilibria means that it is both meaningful
and interesting to allow for the same treatment to appear at more than one observation. We
have explained this at length in Section 5.1 and we shall not repeat it here. We allow identical
treatments to appear more than once in E if they correspond to di↵erent observations. We refer
to a a1, a2, ..., aT t TAt as an SC-rationalizable path on E if the induced ‘panel’ data set
at, yt, At t T is SC-rationalizable (in the sense defined in Section 4). The set of SC-rationalizable
paths on E is denoted by A.
Definition 4. A data set O µt, yt, At t T is stochastically SC-rationalizable if there is a
probability distribution on A such that µt x a AQ a 1 a
t x for all t T and x X.
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Unless there is danger of confusion, we shall simply refer to a data set as SC-rationalizable when
it is stochastically SC-rationalizable. This definition says that the population can be decomposed
into ‘group types’ corresponding to di↵erent SC-rationalizable paths, so that we could interpret the
action profile for each group as a Nash equilibrium, with players having SID preferences that are
the same across observations; it captures the idea that treatments are randomly assigned across the
large population of groups, so that the distribution of types is identical across treatments. As in
the single agent case discussed in Section 5.1, the definition allows for groups belonging to di↵erent
types to have members with the same preferences, because of the possibility of multiple equilibria.
It is also worth emphasizing that the definition imposes no restrictions on what groups can be
formed; for example, if a data set consists of a population of heterosexual couples, then the set
of SC-rationalizable paths A allows for all possible matchings between di↵erent types of male and
female players.
By Theorem 2, a path on E is SC-rationalizable if and only if it is ARC-consistent in the sense
that at, yt, At t T obeys ARC. This leads immediately to the following result.
Theorem 6. A data set O µt, yt, At t T is SC-rationalizable if and only if there exists a
probability distribution Q on A , the set of ARC-consistent paths on E, such that
µt x
a A
Q a 1 at x for all t T and x X. (23)
Given an SC-rationalizable data set O µt, yt, At t T , the out-of-sample predictions at some
given environment y0, A0 Y A can be obtained by identifying those distributions µ0 (which
must have their support on A0) such that the augmented stochastic data set O µ0, y0, A0 is
SC-rationalizable. We refer to µ0 as a possible (Nash) equilibrium distribution and denote the set
of these distributions by PED y0, A0 . It follows immediately from Theorem 6 that µ0 is a possible
equilibrium distribution if and only if there exists a probability distribution Q on A , the set of
ARC-consistent paths on the set of environments E y0, A0 , such that for every t T 0
and x X,
µt x
a A
Q a 1 at x for all t T 0 and x X. (24)
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All the elements of PED ⇠0, A0 can be obtained by solving the equations (24). The unknown
variables in this system are Q a for all a A and µ0 x for all x A0, and the equations are
linear in these variables, which implies that PED ⇠0, A0 is a convex set. It follows that the possible
fraction of the population playing a particular strategy profile x˜ at ⇠0, A0 will take values in an
interval, with its limits obtained by solving the appropriate linear programs. (See the analogous
result at the end of Section 5.1.)
If we wish, we can also form set estimates of the fraction of players in a particular role who
choose a given action. Formally, a distribution µ0 on X induces a distribution ⌫0i on the equilibrium
actions of player i; for each x˜i Xi,
⌫0i x˜i
x A0:xi x˜i
µ0 x . (25)
The set of possible distributions on player i’s equilibrium actions, which we shall denote by
PEDi ⇠0, A0 is also convex. This follows immediately from the convexity of PED ⇠0, A0 . Since
PEDi ⇠0, A0 is a convex set, the predicted fraction of players in role i who choose a particular
action x˜i from A0i is given precisely by the closed interval
min ⌫0i x˜i : ⌫
0
i PEDi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i , max ⌫
0
i x˜i : ⌫
0
i PEDi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i .
By (25), the value of max ⌫0i x˜i : ⌫
0
i PEDi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i can be easily obtained by solving the following
linear program:
x A0:xi x˜i
µ0i x subject to Q a a A and µ
0 xi xi A0i satisfying (24).
In a similar vein, we can calculate min ⌫0i x˜i : ⌫
0
i PEDi ⇠
0
i , A
0
i .
6 Application: Smoking Decisions in Married Couples
We now apply the results of Section 5.2 to the analysis of smoking decisions among married couples.
Each married couple is modeled as a group whose members decide whether or not to smoke, with
the smoking decision of each person depending on both the smoking decision of his/her partner
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Figure 3: Conditional Smoking Rates
and the smoking policy at his/her workplace. We use a data set that provides us with the smoking
decision and the workplace smoking policy for each member of a large population of married couples.
Di↵ering workplace smoking policies provide the treatment variation needed for testing the presence
of strategic complementarity. Similar data has also been used by Cutler and Glaeser (2010). As we
do, they test for (and find) the presence of interaction in smoking behavior among married couples,
using the exogenous variation in workplace smoking policies as an instrument. Their work di↵ers
from ours in that they use a reduced form parametric model of smoking behavior.
6.1 Data
We employ the Tobacco Use Supplement of the Current Population Survey (TUS-CPS) to get infor-
mation on both smoking decisions and workplace smoking policies. This is an NCI-sponsored survey
of tobacco use that has been administered as part of the US Census Bureau’s Current Population
Survey every 2 to 3 years since 1992. We focus on the period 1992-1993 because, in contrast to more
recent years, a significant proportion of workplaces then did not have smoking restrictions, which
guarantees that we have enough treatment variation. While the smoking information is obtained
from everyone in our population of interest, the question on workplace smoking policy is posed
only to indoor workers. Thus, we restrict attention to married couples where both members work
indoors. After eliminating from our sample all couples where at least one member did not reply to
all the questions of interest, we have 5,363 married couples across the US.
Within this sample, the smoking rate is 23.8% among the men and 18.7% among the women.
Smoking is permitted in 19.7% of husbands’ workplaces and 15% of wives’ workplaces. Figure 3
displays the conditional probabilities of smoking given partner’s smoking behavior (left panel) and
smoking policy at work (right panel). As we can see, irrespective of gender, the probability of
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Figure 4: Joint Distribution of Smoking Choices Across Smoking Policies
smoking is larger when either the partner smokes or when smoking is permitted in the workplace.
Overall, the fraction of spouses that make the same smoking choice —either both smoke or do not
smoke— is around 80% of the whole sample. These figures are at least suggestive of the influence
of spousal behavior and workplace policy on smoking decisions. To examine this issue more closely,
we now apply the test developed in Section 5.2.
6.2 Findings
Figure 4 displays the distribution of joint choices regarding smoking decisions for four di↵erent
workplace smoking policies, which serve as treatments in our analysis. As before, we use µ to
indicate the probability of each action profile for each workplace smoking policy. The first argument
of µ takes the value of S if the husband smokes and N otherwise; the second argument indicates the
smoking decision of his wife. Similarly, the first argument in Workplace Smoking Policy takes the
value of 1 if smoking is permitted in the working place of the husband and 0 otherwise; the second
argument indicates the smoking policy at the wife’s workplace. In this application, the choice set
of each person is N,S and it remains the same across observations.
We use Theorem 6 to test if this data set is SC-rationalizable. (Appendix II gives a fuller
description of the procedure.) Notice that in this application there are a priori 44 256 group
paths, since for each of the four possible treatment values, there are four joint choices that a
married couple can make. One could check that 64 of these paths are SC-rationalizable. For our
test to be valid, we must assume that the population is randomly assigned to these four treatments,
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Figure 5: Closest SC-rationalizable distribution of smoking choices
so that the distribution of the 64 types is the same across treatments. For now at least, let us also
ignore issues of sample size and treat the observations in Figure 4 as the true distribution of joint
actions across the four treatments. In that case, we can test for SC-rationalizability by checking if
there is a positive solution to the linear system (23), where the solution vector, if it exists, gives
the proportion of the population belonging to each of the 64 types. Performing this test, we find
that there is in fact no solution to the linear system, so the data set is not SC-rationalizable.
This may come as a surprise, since the number of unknowns (64) far exceeds the number of
linear constraints and it is tempting to think that the conditions are very permissive. In fact,
there is at least one easy-to-understand reason why the data set displayed in Figure 4 is not SC-
rationalizable. Notice from Figure 4 that µ N, S 1, 0 9.1% 8.6% µ N, S 0, 1 . This is
impossible because, to be consistent with strategic complementarity, any couple type that selects
N,S under the smoking policy 1, 0 must select N,S again under the smoking policy 0, 1 .13
Interestingly, if we solve for the data set that is SC-rationalizable and closest (as measured by the
sum of square deviations) to the one actually observed, the solution, as displayed in Figure 5, sets
µ N, S 1, 0 µ N, S 0, 1 8.8%.
If we compare the entries in Figures 4 and 5, we see immediately that they are quite close,
which naturally makes us wonder whether the observed violation of SC-rationalizability is in fact
significant. To address this issue, we adopt the approach recently proposed by Kitamura and Stoye
13Let h be the husband’s preference and w the wife’s preference. Then N,S 1, 0 h S, S 1, 0 implies
that N,S 0, 1 h S, S 0, 1 , so S, S 0, 1 is ruled out as an equilibrium. Furthermore, N,S 1, 0 h S, S 1, 0
implies N,N 0, 1 h S,N 0, 1 , so S,N 0, 1 is impossible as well. Turning now to the wife, since N,S 1, 0 w
N,N 1, 0 , we obtain N,S 0, 1 w N,N 0, 1 , so N,N 0, 1 cannot be an equilibrium.
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(2013); they develop a method of evaluating the statistical significance of a data set violating a set of
linear constraints that directly applies to our framework.14 Roughly speaking, the test assumes that
the closest compatible distribution displayed in Figure 5 is the true population distribution, and
uses a bootstrap procedure to calculate the likelihood of getting a sample like the one we observe.
By applying their test, we find that the probability of getting our sample (or a more extreme one),
assuming that our modelling restrictions are true, is 0.3795. The latter corresponds to the p-value
for the null hypothesis that our modelling assumptions are true. This means that we cannot reject
SC-rationalizability at a significance level of 5% or 10%. (See Appendix II for a fuller description
of the Kitamura-Stoye procedure and our implementation.)
To examine the issue more closely, we also divided the entire sample into three smaller sub-
samples, according to the educational attainment of the couples: (i) both spouses have high educa-
tion levels (measured as having at least some college education); (ii) both have low education levels;
and (iii) one spouse has high education level and the other a low education level. We find that the
choice probabilities of the group where both spouses have high education levels are directly con-
sistent with our modelling restrictions, i.e., the observed choice probabilities are SC-rationalizable.
The other two groups are not directly consistent with the model, with the p-values being 0.509
and 0.127 respectively for the couples with low education and couples with mixed education levels
respectively.
Appendix I
We have shown in Lemma 1 that RTi has the interval property. The following extension of that
result is needed for the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma A1: The binary relations RTSi ,
RTS
i , and
RTST
i on Xi ⌅i have the interval property.
Proof. Let xi xi xi. (The case where xi xi xi can be proved in a similar way.) If
xi , ⇠i
RTS
i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i holds, there exists some ⇠i ⇠i such that xi , ⇠i
RT
i xi, ⇠i . By
the interval property of RTi , we obtain xi , ⇠i
RT
i xi, ⇠i . Since xi xi and ⇠i ⇠i, we
have that xi , ⇠i
RTS
i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i . So we have shown that
RTS
i and
RTS
i have the interval
14Kitamura and Stoye (2013) apply their test to the consumer utility-maximization problem.
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property.
If xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i , there exists a sequence z
1
i , z
2
i , ..., z
k
i such that
xi , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
2
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ...
RTS
i z
k
i , ⇠i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i .
Letting z0i xi and z
k 1
i xi, since xi xi xi, we can find some 0 m k such that
zmi xi z
m 1
i . By the interval property of
RTS
i , we obtain z
m
i , ⇠i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i . Thus
xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i since xi , ⇠i
RTST
i z
m
i , ⇠i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i .
Proof of Lemma 2: We first prove that (11) holds. (11) is equivalent to RTSi being cyclically
consistent, i.e.,
z1i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
2
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ...
RTS
i z
k
i , ⇠i z
k
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i . (26)
Cyclical consistency can in turn be equivalently re-formulated as the following:
z1i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
2
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ...
RTS
i z
k
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i (27)
z1i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
2
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ...
RTS
i z
k
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i
Thus, whenever there is a cycle like (27), it must be the case that
z1i , ⇠i
RT
i z
2
i , ⇠i
RT
i ...
RT
i z
k
i , ⇠i
RT
i z
1
i , ⇠i
We prove (11) by induction on the length of the chain, k, on the left side of (26). Whenever (26)
holds for chains of length k or less (equivalently, whenever the cycles in (27) have length k or less),
we say that RTSi is k-consistent. For 2-consistency, we need to show that
z1i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
2
i , ⇠i z
2
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i .
Suppose that z1i z
2
i ; the case of z
1
i z
2
i can be dealt with in a similar way. By definition,
if z1i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
2
i , ⇠i then there is ⇠i ⇠i such that z
1
i , ⇠i
RT
i z
2
i , ⇠i . On the other hand,
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if z2i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i , then there is ⇠i ⇠i such that z
2
i , ⇠i
RT
i z
1
i , ⇠i and so we obtain a
violation of ARC.
Suppose that RTSi is k-consistent for all k k¯. To show that k¯-consistency holds, suppose the
left side of (26) holds for k k¯ and z1i z
k¯
i . Clearly, there must be m k¯ such that z
m
i z
k¯
i and
zm 1i i z
k¯
i . We consider two cases separately: (A) z
m
i z
1
i and (B) z
m
i z
1
i . In case (A), by the
interval property of RTSi , we obtain z
m
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
k¯
i , ⇠i . By way of contradiction, suppose also
that zk¯i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i . Then the interval property of
RTS
i guarantees that z
k¯
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
m
i , ⇠i
and so we obtain a violation of 2-consistency. For case (B), since zmi , ⇠i
RTS
i z
m 1
i , ⇠i , the interval
property guarantees that zmi , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i . So we obtain the cycle
z1i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
2
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ...
RTS
i z
m
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i (28)
which has length strictly lower than k¯. By the induction hypothesis, we obtain
z1i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
2
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ...
RTS
i z
m
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i
and so we can replace each RTSi in (28) by
RT
i . Furthermore, z
m
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i guarantees
that zmi , ⇠i
RTS
i z
m 1
i , ⇠i , by the interval property of
RTS
i . Therefore, z
1
i , ⇠i
RT
i x
m 1
i , ⇠i
and, by the interval property of RTi , we obtain z
1
i , ⇠i
RT
i x
k¯
i , ⇠i . 2-consistency then ensures
that zk¯i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i . This completes the proof that (11) holds.
By definition, RTSTi obeys SSCD if whenever xi xi and ⇠i ⇠i or xi xi and ⇠i ⇠i, then
xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i .
We shall concentrate on the case where xi xi; the other case has a similar proof. If xi , ⇠i
RTS
i
xi, ⇠i , then we know that there is z
j
i (for j 1, 2, ..., k) such that
xi , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
2
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ...
RTS
i z
k
i , ⇠i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i . (29)
We can also choose a chain with the property that (writing z0i xi and z
k 1
i xi) z
m
i , ⇠i
RTS
i
zmi , ⇠i for m m 1; in other words, no link in the chain can be dropped. We claim that, for
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such a chain, we must have
xi z
1
i z
2
i ... z
k
i xi. (30)
Once this is established, the rest is straightforward: since RTSi obeys SSCD, (29) and (30) imply
xi , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
2
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ...
RTS
i z
k
i , ⇠i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i
and so xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i .
It remains for us to establish (30). If this is false then there is m such that zm 1i z
m
i .
Let zm ni be the first time after z
m 1
i such that z
m n
i z
m
i . Then we have z
m n
i z
m
i z
m n 1
i .
Since zm n 1i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
m n
i , ⇠i , the interval property of
RTS
i guarantees that z
m n 1
i , ⇠i
RTS
i
zmi , ⇠i . Thus we obtain a cycle
zmi , ⇠i
RTS
i z
m 1
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ...
RTS
i z
m n 1
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
m
i , ⇠i .
Since RTSi is cyclically consistent, this chain cannot be related by
RTS
i and must be related by
RT
i . In particular, z
m n 1
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
m
i , ⇠i and thus z
m n 1
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
m n
i , ⇠i (by the interval
property of RTSi ). We conclude that z
m
i , ⇠i
RT
i z
m n
i , ⇠i and thus we can shorten (29) to
xi , ⇠i
RTS
i z
1
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ...
RTS
i z
m
i , ⇠i
RTS
i z
m n
i , ⇠i
RTS
i ... z
k
i , ⇠i
RTS
i xi, ⇠i
which contradicts our assumption that no link in the chain can be dropped.
Proof of Lemma 3: We first show that i is a preference that rationalizes Oi. Clearly, i is
complete and reflexive, so to demonstrate that it is a preference we need only show that it is
transitive. Indeed, suppose
ai, ⇠i i bi, ⇠i i ci, ⇠i i ai, ⇠i .
There are only four fundamentally distinct cases we need to consider:
Case 1. None of the three elements are related by RTSTi . Given the definition of i , this means
that ai bi ci ai, which is impossible.
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Case 2. ai bi ci, ai, ⇠i kRTSTi bi, ⇠i , bi, ⇠i kRTSTi ci, ⇠i , and ci, ⇠i RTSTi ai, ⇠i . This is
again impossible since the interval property of RTSTi will imply that ci, ⇠i
RTST
i bi, ⇠i .
Case 3. ai bi, ai, ⇠i kRTSTi bi, ⇠i , bi, ⇠i RTSTi ci, ⇠i RTSTi ai, ⇠i . This is also impossible
because, by the transitivity of RTST , we obtain bi, ⇠i RTSTi ai, ⇠i .
Case 4. ai, ⇠i RTSTi bi, ⇠i
RTST
i ci, ⇠i
RTST
i ai, ⇠i . By (11), this is only possible if
ai, ⇠i
RT
i bi, ⇠i
RT
i ci, ⇠i
RT
i ai, ⇠i ,
but then we also obtain, by the transitivity of RTi , ai, ⇠i
RT
i ci, ⇠i and, hence, ai, ⇠i i ci, ⇠i .
Lastly, since RTSTi by construction, it is clear that i rationalizes Oi.
To show that i obeys SSCD, let xi xi and ⇠i ⇠i; then
xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i
xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i
xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i ,
in which the first implication follows from the definition of i , the second implication from the
SSCD property of RTSTi , and the third from the fact that i contains
RTST
i (so i extends
RTST
i in the sense of (10)). The last claim is true because if xi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i , then Lemma 2
says that xi, ⇠i
RTST
i xi , ⇠i ; thus xi, ⇠i i xi , ⇠i and we obtain xi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i .
It remains for us to show that, for every ⇠i ⌅i, BR ⇠i, K, is nonempty and finite, where
K Xi and K is compact in R. If K ati for every t T , then, it follows from the definition of
i that m, ⇠i i zi, ⇠i , where m minK and zi K. In this case, m is the only maximiser
of i in K. Suppose that K a
t
i for some t. Since there are a finite number of observations, we
can find some asi K such that a
s
i , ⇠i i a
t
i, ⇠i for every a
t
i K. We claim that either m or a
s
i
maximises i in K for ⇠i, so that BR ⇠i, K, is indeed nonempty and finite. There are two cases
to consider.
Suppose m, ⇠i i a
s
i , ⇠i and there is zi K such that zi, ⇠i i m, ⇠i . Then, since m zi,
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it must hold that zi, ⇠i RTSTi m, ⇠i and there is t T such that zi ati. Consequently,
ati, ⇠i i m, ⇠i i a
s
i , ⇠i i a
t
i, ⇠i ,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, m, ⇠i i xi, ⇠i for all xi K. Now suppose a
s
i , ⇠i i
m, ⇠i . For every xi m,n , either asi , ⇠i
RTST
i xi, ⇠i , in which case a
s
i , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i , or
asi , ⇠i kRTSTi xi, ⇠i , in which case we have asi , ⇠i i m, ⇠i i xi, ⇠i . Thus asi , ⇠i i xi, ⇠i
for all xi K.
Proof of Theorem 3. Part (ii) follows straightforwardly from part (i), so we shall focus on
proving (i), which consists of three claims. Proposition 2 says that (15) holds. To see that (18)
holds, first note that a˜i PRi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i if and only if Oi Oi a˜i, a i, y0i , A0i violates
ARC. Since Hi is not a singleton, it must be an interval and so there is no ai such that ai, a
t
i
for some t T . Therefore, Oi violates ARC if and only if there is aˆi A0i and a¯ i such that
aˆi, a¯ i, y¯i RTi a˜i, a¯ i, y¯i with either (1) aˆi a˜i and a¯ i, y¯i a i, y
0
i or (2) aˆi a˜i and
a¯ i, y¯i a i, y
0
i . Note that there is t T such that aˆi, a¯ i at; in particular, this means that
a¯ i j iA
T . It follows from our definition of Hi that a¯ i, y¯i a i, y
0
i if a¯ i, y¯i a i, y
0
i
and a¯ i, y¯i a i, y
0
i if a¯ i, y¯i a i, y
0
i . Thus Oi Oi a˜i, a i, y0i , A0i also violates ARC.
We conclude that a˜i PRi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i if a˜i PRi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i , which establishes (18).
Lastly, we show that PRi a i, y0i , A
0
i consists of a finite union of intervals of A
0
i . This is
equivalent to showing that A0i PRi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i is a finite union of intervals; an element a˜i is
in this set if and only if there is t T such that ati A0i and ati, ⇠0i RTSTi a˜i, ⇠0i , where
⇠0i a i, y
0 . This is turns holds if and only if is s T such that either (1) ati, ⇠0i RTSTi asi , ⇠0i
and asi , ⇠
0
i
RTS
i a˜i, ⇠
0
i or (2) a
t
i, ⇠
0
i
RTST
i a
s
i , ⇠
0
i and a
s
i , ⇠
0
i
RT
i a˜i, ⇠
0
i . Notice for a fixed
s T , the sets ai A0i : asi , ⇠0i RTSi ai, ⇠0i and ai A0i : asi , ⇠0i RTi ai, ⇠0i both con-
sist of intervals, because of the interval property on RTSi and
RT
i respectively. It follows that
A0i PRi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i is a finite union of intervals.
The proof of Theorem 4 uses the following lemma.
Lemma A2: Suppose O at, yt, At Tt 1 obeys ARC and let A0 A. Then the map pi : A0 i Y
A0i given by
pi a i, yi supPRi a i, yi, A
0
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has the following properties: (i) it is increasing in a i, yi A0 i Yi; (ii) for a i and a i in
Hi, pi a i, yi pi a i, yi ; and (iii) if, for some a¯ i, y¯i , pi a¯ i, y¯i PRi a¯ i, y¯i, A
0 and for
some aˆ i, yˆi a¯ i, y¯i , pi a¯ i, y¯i pi aˆ i, yˆi , then pi aˆ i, yˆi PRi aˆ i, yˆi, A
0 .
Remark: In a similar way, we define pi : A
0
i Yi A
0
i by pi a i, yi inf PRi a i, yi, A
0 . This
function will obey properties (i) and (ii) and, instead of property (iii), it will have the following
property (iii) : if, for some a¯ i, y¯i , pi a¯ i, y¯i PRi a¯ i, y¯i, A
0 and for some aˆ i, yˆi a¯ i, y¯i ,
pi a¯ i, y¯i pi aˆ i, yˆi , then pi aˆ i, yˆi PRi aˆ i, yˆi, A
0 .
Proof. Since PRi a i, yi, A0 is the union of a collection of best response correspondences (see
(13)), each of which is increasing in a i, yi , pi must be increasing. Claim (ii) is an immediate
consequence of (18) (which was proved in Theorem 3). Lastly, if pi a¯ i, y¯i PRi a¯ i, y¯i, A
0
then there is i Pi such that pi a¯ i, y¯i BRi a¯ i, y¯i, A0i , i . Since the best response corre-
spondence is increasing, there is ai BRi aˆ i, yˆi, A
0
i , i , and thus in PRi aˆ i, yˆi, A
0
i , such that
ai pi a¯ i, y¯i . This establishes (iii).
Proof of Theorem 4: We have already explained at the beginning of Section 4 why E y0, A0
is nonempty. We shall confine our attention to showing that max E y0, A0 exists, where E y0, A0
refers to the closure of E y0, A0 ; the proof for the other case is similar.15 Firstly, note that the prop-
erties of pi listed in Lemma A2 guarantee that there exists a sequence of functions p
k
i , y
0
i , A
0
i k N
selected from PRi , y0i , A
0
i with the following properties: (i) for a i and a i in Hi, p
k
i a i, y
0
i
pki a i, y
0
i ; (ii) p
k
i a i, y
0
i , A
0
i is increasing in a i and in k; (iii) p
k
i a i, y
0
i , A
0
i pi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i
if pi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i PRi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i ; and (iv) limk p
k
i a i, y
0
i , A
0
i pi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i . In other
words, there is a sequence of increasing selections from PRi , y0, A0 that has pi a i, y
0, A0 as it
limit, with the sequence being exactly equal to pi a i, y
0
i , A
0
i if the latter is a possible response of
player i.
The function pk a, y0, A0 pki a i, y
0
i , A
0
i i N is increasing in a, since p
k
i is increasing in a i.
By Tarski’s fixed point theorem, pk has a largest fixed point, which we denote by xk y0, A0 . Since
15It is worth pointing out an obvious first approach that will not work. Given pi , we can define, for each a A
0,
p a, y0 pi a i, y
0
i i N , and since pi is increasing in a i, so p a, y
0 is increasing in a. By Tarski’s fixed
point theorem, p , y0 will have a fixed point and indeed a largest fixed point a ; thus the existence of max E y0, A0
is ensured if it could be identified with a . However, they are not generally the same points: it is straightforward to
construct an increasing (but not compact-valued) correspondence such that its largest fixed point does not coincide
with the largest fixed point of its supremum function. Our proof takes a di↵erent route.
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pki , y
0
i , A
0
i is a selection from PRi , y
0
i , A
0
i , x
k y0, A0 E y0, A0 . By the monotone fixed points
theorem (see Section 2), the sequence xk y0, A0 is increasing with k. Since A0 is compact, this
sequence must have a limit. This limit, which we denote by a y0, A0 , lies in E y0, A0 .
We claim that a y0, A0 x˜, for any x˜ E y0, A0 . Indeed, since x˜i PRi x˜ i, y0i , A0i for all
i N , for k su ciently large, pki x˜ i, y
0
i , A
0
i x˜i. Now consider the map p
k confined to the domain
S i N ai A0i : ai x˜i . Since p
k is increasing, the image of pk also falls on S; in other words,
pk can be considered as a map from S to itself. It is also an increasing map and, by Tarski’s fixed
point theorem will have a largest fixed point. The largest fixed point of pk restricted to S must
again be xk y0, A0 and it follows from our construction that xk y0, A0 x˜. In turn this implies
that a y0, A0 x˜. So a y0, A0 is an upper bound of E y0, A0 and thus also an upper bound
of E y0, A0 . Given that a y0, A0 E y0, A0 , we conclude that a y0, A0 max E y0, A0 .
To see that a y, A0 is increasing with respect to the parameter, consider y y . Given
the properties of pi listed in Lemma A2, we can choose functions p
k
i , yi, A
0
i k N selected from
PRi , yi, A0i (for yi yi and yi ) satisfying properties (i) – (iv) and, in addition, p
k
i a i, yi , A
0
i
pki a i, yi, A
0
i for all a i. The map p
k , yi , A
0
i is increasing and will have a largest fixed point
xk y 0 which, by the monotone fixed points theorem satisfies xk y 0 xk y 0 . Taking limits as
k , we obtain a y 0 a y 0 .
Appendix II
AII.1 Data and Testing Procedures
We use the Tobacco Use Supplement to the Current Population Survey (TUS-CPS) to get informa-
tion on both smoking decisions and workplace smoking policies. This is an NCI-sponsored survey
of tobacco use that has been administered as part of the US Census Bureau’s Current Population
Survey every 2 to 3 years from 1992-1993. We focus on years 1992-1993 because, unlike more recent
periods, there were still significant numbers of workplaces that permitted smoking. This guaran-
tees we have enough treatment variation. While smoking information is asked of everyone in our
population of interest, the smoking ban question is asked only of indoor workers. Thus, we restrict
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attention to married couples where both members work indoor. After eliminating from our sample
all couples where at least one member does not reply to the questions of interest, we have 5,363
married couples across the US. For 2,643 couples, both members have high education levels (the
precise sense in which we explain later), for 1,422 couples, both members have low education levels,
and for the remaining 1,298 couples, one spouse has a high education level and the other low.
We merge the relevant information of years 1992 and 1993. We first recover the information for
September 1992 and add the information for January 1993 and July 1993 regarding spouses that do
not appear in the previous period/s of time. We tabulate responses according to the variables from
the Data Dictionary of the Current Population Survey for years 1992-1993 that we detail next.
Married Couples We consider as married couples all pairs where one of them is the reference
person and the other one responds either 3. Husband or 4. Wife to question A-RRP Item 18B
(Relationship to reference person).
Smoking Decisions We assign the value 0 (does not smoke) to all persons that respond either 2.
No to question A-S32 (Has... smoked at least 100 cigarettes in his/her entire life?) or 3. Not at all
to question A-S34 (Does... now smoke cigarettes every day, some days, or not at all?). We assign
value 1 (smokes) to all persons that respond either 1. Every day or 2. Some days to question A-S34
(Does... now smoke cigarettes every day, some days, or not at all?).
Smoking Restrictions at Workplace We assign the value 0 (smoking restrictions at workplace)
to all persons that respond 1. Yes to question A-S68 (Does your place of work have an o cial policy
that restricts smoking in anyway?). We assign value of 1 (no smoking restrictions at workplace) to
all persons that respond 2. No to question A-S68 (Does your place of work have an o cial policy
that restricts smoking in anyway?).
Education We consider as high educated couples (HE) all those married couples (defined above)
where both members report that they have high education levels; specifically these are couples
where both members respond 40. Some college but not degree or above to question A-HGA Item
18H (Education attainment). We consider as low educated couples (LE) all those married couples
where both members respond strictly below 40. Some college but not degree to question A-HGA
Item 18H (Education attainment). We consider as mixed educated couples (Mix) all married couples
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Figure 6: Joint Distribution of Smoking Choices Across Smoking Policies (HE)
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Figure 7: Joint Distribution of Smoking Choices Across Smoking Policies (Mix)
where one member has a high education level and the other a low education level.
We have already displayed the survey results for all couples in Figure 4 in the main body of
the paper. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the corresponding results when the survey responses are
disaggregated into HE, LE, and Mix couples.
AII.2 Test and Closest Compatible Distribution
Testing whether a data set is consistent with strategic complementarity involves checking whether
a system of linear equations
Ax B. (31)
has a positive solution x. We describe next all the components of this system.
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Figure 8: Joint Distribution of Smoking Choices Across Smoking Policies (LE)
Matrix A This matrix is composed of 0’s and 1’s and describes the behavior (in terms of choices)
of all SC-rationalizable group types. Recall that a group type specifies the profile of choices that the
group makes for each possible vector of parameter values. In this case, A is a 16 64-matrix. Each
row in matrix A corresponds to one of the 16 possible combinations of (joint) smoking choices and
treatment values. An ijth element of matrix A takes value 1 if the jth group selects the smoking
decision under the treatment corresponding to that row.
Vector B The size of this column vector is 16. It is composed of 4 conditional distributions. Each
conditional distribution specifies the fraction of groups that, for a given treatment, make each of
the four possible joint decisions.
Vector x This size of this column vector is 64. It represents a possible probability distribution
over the set of SC-rationalizable group types.
We implement our test by using Matlab. Specifically, we use the program
x linprog lb, , , A,B, lb,
to check whether system (31) has a positive solution in x. In this specification, inputs A and B are
described as above and lb corresponds to a column vector of 64 zeros.
For those data vectors B that do not pass this test, we use program lsqnonneg in Matlab to find
the positive vector x, with its components adding up to 1, that minimize B Ax B Ax .
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AII.3 Small Sample Inference Procedure
As Kitamura and Stoye (2013) explain, the null hypothesis is equivalent to
(H) min
x R K B Ax B Ax 0
where K is the number of SC-rationalizable group types (64 in our case). A natural sample
counterpart of the objective function in H is given by
B Ax B Ax
where B estimates B by sample choice frequencies. Normalizing the latter by sample size N , we
get
JN N minx R K B Ax B Ax .
Let x be any solution to this problem. If Ax B, so that the observed choices are compatible
with our restrictions, then JN 0 and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Kitamura and Stoye (2013) proposes the following bootstrap algorithm to test H:
(i) Obtain a vector x that solves
JN N min x ⌧N164 R64 B Ax B Ax
and compute C⌧N Ax . In our application, we let ⌧N lnN N 64, where N is the minimum
out the number of couples in each of the four treatments. (As Kitamura and Stoye (2013) explain,
the tuning parameter ⌧N plays the role of a similar tuning parameter in the moment selection
approach.)
(ii) Calculate the boostrap estimators under the restriction
B r⌧N B
r B C⌧N r 1, ..., R
where C⌧N derives from step (i) and B
r is a re-sampled choice probability vector obtained via
standard nonparametric boostrap. In addition, R is the number of boostrap replications. In the
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paper, we let R 2000.
(iii) Calculate the boostrap test statistic by solving the following problem
J rN ⌧N N min x ⌧N164 R64 B
r
⌧N
Ax B r⌧N Ax
for r 1, ..., R.
(iv) Use the empirical distribution of J rN ⌧N , r 1, ..., R, to obtain the critical value of JN .
We implement this procedure four times, namely, on all married couples, HE couples, LE couples,
and Mix couples. In the case of HE couples, the vector B is directly consistent, so the p-value of
the test for this group is 1 and we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The p-values for the data set
corresponding to all married couples is 0.3795, the one for LE is 0.509, and the one for Mix is 0.127.
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